



**AN INTERTEXTUAL READING OF PARIS' (RE)ACTIONS IN THE *ILIAD* 6
BASED ON PLATO'S TRIPARTITE THEORY OF SOUL**

**UMA ABORDAGEM INTERTEXTUAL DAS (RE)AÇÕES DA PERSONAGEM
PARIS NA *ILÍADA* 6 COM BASE NA TEORIA TRIPARTITE DA ALMA DE
PLATÃO**

*Pedro Proscurcin Junior*¹

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to elucidate some intricate (re-)actions of Paris in the *Iliad* 6 based on Plato's tripartite theory of soul. Due to certain philosophical prejudices, some interpretations cannot identify certain nuances related to the characters' intrapsychic activities and tend to label the Homeric character as "simple" or "incomplete". Since the problem of "anachronism" is insurmountable, interpreters have to ensure the best philosophical model to understand some aspects of the Homeric psychology. For different reasons, I shall argue that an intertextual approach based on the theory of soul in Plato's *Republic* can help us better understand certain emotional impulses. Finally, the paper will take a closer look at some aspects involving the example of Paris' *epithymetic* reactions in the *Iliad* 6.

Keywords: Philosophy of Literature. Homeric psychology. Plato's tripartite theory of soul. *Iliad* 6. Paris' emotional reactions.

RESUMO

Este artigo tem como objetivo elucidar algumas (re-)ações intrincadas do personagem Paris na *Ilíada* 6 com base na teoria tripartite da alma de Platão. Devido a certas pré-concepções filosóficas, algumas interpretações de classicistas não estariam aptas a identificar dadas nuances relacionadas às atividades intrapsíquicas das personagens e tenderiam a rotular o personagem homérico como "simples" ou "incompleto". Visto que o problema do "anacronismo" é intransponível, os intérpretes devem assegurar o melhor modelo filosófico para compreender alguns aspectos da psicologia homérica. Por diferentes razões, argumentar-se-á que uma abordagem intertextual baseada na teoria da alma da *República* de Platão pode nos ajudar a entender melhor certos impulsos emocionais desses personagens. Ao final, o artigo examinará mais de perto alguns aspectos que envolvem o exemplo das reações *epitiméticas* de Paris na *Ilíada* 6.

Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Literatura. Psicologia homérica. Teoria tripartite da alma de Platão. *Ilíada* 6. Reações emocionais de Paris.

¹ Doutor em Filosofia pela Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (Uni-Bonn). E-mail: pedroprj@gmail.com.
CV Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/1478723295674261>.
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0053-4921>.



It is well known that Plato was influenced by Homer. For instance, this can be demonstrated by the relevance of Homeric references in his writings.² In different texts, he interprets passages of the Homeric poems and thereby tries to grasp the sense involved in them. However, the most interesting aspect related to this fact is that when Plato reads the poems, he also provides means to understand the characters' actions in the Homeric text. This does not only happen with the explicit references in his philosophical works or with the way in which he transcribes those quotations, but also when he elaborates his psychological theory³.

I believe that when Plato directly or indirectly quotes Homer, he helps us build a defining intertextuality.⁴ This kind of intertextuality is, in my view, a fundamental tool to better understand complex scenes (or contexts) in the Homeric poems, since the current philosophical framework – used by some classicists – fails to expose in detail certain characters' reactions. The aim of this paper is to apply Plato's conceptual psychology in order to analyze Paris' psychological manifestations in the *Iliad* 6. As we know, Book 6 is the most widely read book of *Iliad*. It brings a different environment to the story, since its major scenes happen within the walls of Troy, and exhibits us the intimacy of the Trojans. Paris – also known as Alexander – is in Helen's chamber, and because of his defeat by Menelaus in the *Iliad* 3 he feels “sorrow” or “grief” (ἄχος) (*Il.* 6, 336). At least this is the argument that he uses to persuade his brother (Hector). In addition, especially since Hector's admonition, he knows that his conduct has led his city (the people) and his relatives to war.⁵ To overcome this severe humiliation, he will later express his desire to go to the battlefield as fast as possible, where the Trojans struggle.

Another issue that will be incidentally addressed in this paper concerns the reason why I am applying a Platonic interpretation of Homeric emotions. As we can understand from the

² One good example is a famous monologue scene in the *Odyssey* (XX, 17-18) applied by Plato to explain the conflict inside the elements of the soul in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic*. Of course, I am not considering here specific works like Plato's *Ion* or the general role of Homeric references in Plato.

³ Despite Plato's severe criticism of Homer in the *Republic*, he quotes the poet in different contexts and was certainly influenced by him. For an overview of Plato's criticisms of poetry and Homer, see Proscurein Jr., 2018, p. 5. See v.g. *Resp.* 377d, 378d, 393d, 599c-601a, 603c-605c, 607b. Cf. *Ion* 533d-534e; *Phdr.* 245a; *Apol.* 22b-d; *Leg.* 858c-859, among other passages.

⁴ Under the term “intertextuality” I understand the interrelationship between texts and, in the specific case of this paper, how a text (involved in a certain cultural environment) can help us understand another one. I am working with a term coined by Julia Kristeva (1980, p. 66), who was inspired by the works of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. The present analysis focuses on another degree of intertextuality in which the aim is not to observe “the transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into the other”, as Kristeva does (1984, pp. 59-60), but rather to better explain an initial context (Homer) with the proper philosophical tools of another one (Plato). The notion of “transposition” is replaced by the one of complementarity. In the specific example of Plato's *Republic*, this last context already dialogues with the initial one and often tries to understand it. Here I am expanding the original notion and giving a more appropriate sense related to the present analysis.

⁵ Hector remembers the habits of the nobility especially at war. These habits indicate the values on the basis of which their actions will be judged by their peers. These actions have a connection with the characters' passions like lust, fear, courage etc.



traditional commentaries on the *Iliad*, some interpreters still fail to grasp how the philological interpretation has a deep connection with the philosophical framework applied. Perhaps this has something to do with their main concern, *i.e.* usually the focus on formal or grammatical aspects of the poem. What is more striking is that all interpretations of Homer inescapably make use of a philosophical vocabulary – even when the classicists intend to avoid it – which explains certain inconsistencies between what an original text tries to transmit and the conceptual structure used to understand it.

Some interpreters do not always realize that any kind of “neutral” interpretation applies a vocabulary with a historical background which echoes later philosophical concepts or frameworks. It is based on this observation that we have to understand why some commentators unwittingly apply a Cartesian or a Hegelian vocabulary to understand Homer. It is thus not surprising that some of them are inclined to see incomplete (or primitive) characters in the story.

Therefore, this paper has two main sections. In the first section, I will argue that Greek philosophical vocabularies and concepts are more suitable to understand emotional reactions of Homeric characters. Therefore, I will offer an example of a traditional interpretation to explain the common use of a Cartesian approach to Homer. My goal is to make a few important remarks on the topic, since the intertextual approach aims to provide coherent tools for text’ interpretations and it becomes a central issue within the so-called *philosophy of literature*.

In the second section, I shall argue that the paradigm of Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul, particularly in the *Republic IV*, can help us better understand Paris’ complex reactions in the *Iliad* 6. In addition, I am also arguing that – according to Plato – a Homeric character like Paris is able to make decisions without a divine assistance and that readers can understand his soul’s functions through his desires, beliefs and intentions. At the end, I shall offer some conclusions based on the intertextual analysis undertaken.

1 IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE INTERTEXTUAL APPROACH

In this section, I shall emphasize that Plato’s tripartite theory of soul offers a more suitable philosophical framework to identify complex characters’ reactions in the *Iliad*. Thus, I am going to briefly sketch some of the most important aspects of traditional interpretations of Homer. I have no doubt that the worst possible perspective on Homer applies the idea of primitiveness of the Homeric persons, in which the characters are generally regarded as simple



because they do not have a “consciousness” or a “will”. Using such analyses, the Homeric soul does not have a complexity and the human characters are unable to make real decisions.

Since approximately the first half of the last century, a traditional paradigm related to the Homeric Interpretation has been well exemplified by books like “*The Discovery of the Mind*” (B. Snell), “*The Greeks and the Irrational*” (E.R. Dodds) and “*Merit and Responsibility*” (A.W. Adkins).⁶ In spite of their orientation towards classicists, such books influenced philosophers all around the world. Though unintentionally, these books embrace a specific philosophical vocabulary and the authors employ a particular philosophical structure to read Homeric poems. The main problem is that such interpretations do not focus on the philosophical framework behind the vocabulary they apply, as we can expect from a traditional classical view. Furthermore, this kind of analysis is not especially concerned with the effects of an influent philosophical perspective on the literary interpretation.

If we take into account specifically Snell’s book, we are able to discern certain problems and prejudices in his interpretation.⁷ One can detect two particular philosophical influences on his theoretical approach. On the one hand, he adopts a kind of historical-evolutionary method which dates back to Hegel.⁸ This means that Snell incorporates a predetermined model of Hegelian evolution of human self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*) in his historical approach to the Homeric poems. He presumes that there is a spiritual development in the Greek soul and that this spiritual development of the Greeks is related to the notion of an autonomous and conscious “I” or “self”.⁹ Roughly speaking, his perspective expects to find different degrees of consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) in the Greek texts under analysis. For instance, he sees a development by stages in the notion of self-consciousness and this is necessarily connected with the evolution of the “spirit” or the “soul” (Snell 1955, 12). As the Homeric characters have a divided “self” and lack a unitary “I” or “self” (*i.e.* a unitary conscious “I”), for Snell they must have a primitive “self-conception” (*Selbstauffassung*) (Snell, 1955, p. 42). The Hegelian evolutionary point of view based on the lexical method has a modern philosophical foundation that has nothing to do with the original structure of the Homeric soul.

⁶ See Schmitt, 1990, p. 12; Williams, 1993, pp. 21-22; Gill, 1996, p. 3. Of course, I am dealing with a very influential paradigm of the past century. In this paper, I am not concerned with older classical approaches on the Homeric Psychology such as K. H. W. Völcker (1825), E. Rohde (1898), T. S. Zielinski (1922), U. Wilamowitz (1927) or J. Böhme (1929).

⁷ See esp. Proscurcin Jr., 2014, pp. 24-43.

⁸ Cf. Lesky, 1950, p. 105. Here I am not specifically focusing on other philosophical influences on Snell’s work, such as Kant. Cf. also Adkins, 1960, p. 2.

⁹ As Snell says: “*denn Geist, Seele usw. »sind« nur im Selbstbewusstsein*”. Snell, 1955, p. 12. Cf. Schmitt, 1990, p. 58.



In the same way, since the poems have countless words to indicate the soul's realm (φρήν (φρένες), κῆρ (κέαρ), ἦτορ, κραδίη, πραπίδες, θυμός or νόος), Snell thinks that the poet-narrator is not able to separate an organ from a spiritual or psychic function (Snell 1955, 33). Thus, θυμός or νόος are “organs of the soul” (*Seelenorgane*)¹⁰ and not “parts of the soul” (*Seelenteile*), as Plato holds. He assumes that Homeric characters have a multifaceted soul and ego and, because of that, a character like Achilles or Paris cannot have a conscious “I”. Snell expects to find a Cartesian consciousness in Homer (Proscurcin Jr., 2014, pp. 37-40). As the Cartesian unitary and conscious “self” is not there, so – he concludes – the Homeric characters must be incomplete or imperfect. As the characters lack a “self” or a conscious “I” (ego), this kind of interpretation also claims that they are unable to make “real” decisions. Snell connects the expectation to find a “conscious self” with the disappointment of a Homeric divided soul (multifaceted in many elements) and consequently tends to hold that the Homeric characters are not able to make real decisions. This is certainly a misinterpretation of Homer and this kind of reading has a misplaced philosophical basis. The influence of a Cartesian mode of interpretation may cause misleading consequences for the comprehension of the human soul in the Homeric epics (Gill, 1996, p. 60) and can lead us to believe that a divided soul is necessarily simple. Moreover, it ignores all the metaphorical and metonymical senses implied in the poems (Proscurcin Jr., 2014, p. 46), which is also a historical mistake.

Indeed, classicists are particularly concerned with the so called “anachronism” of certain interpretations. Moreover, some of them use the word “anachronism” to criticize who tries to understand Homer with later tools inspired by philosophy or linguistics. Others hold the opinion that it is necessary to interpret Homer as the Alexandrian grammarians did, *i.e.* applying the maxim *Homerum ex Homero*. This kind of analysis tries to reach the poet's intention just working with the Homeric texts. In philosophical terms, they intend to reach the poet's subjectivity. As we know, this is an impossible task. First, we still do not know if there was a single poet named “Homer”. Second, we do not have his original vocabulary to identify his intentions. The words in the poems are not neutral. Third, even if we had this primordial vocabulary, we would observe that our contemporary use implies on countless unconscious manifestations of a conceptual framework that lies in the background of a modern philosophy.

Besides, it bears mentioning that some commentators of the poems follow to the letter the Alexandrian grammarians and also use the Homeric scholia as the best tool to understand

¹⁰ For Snell, in principle the “organs of the soul” (*Seelenorgane*) do not differ from the “organs of the body” (*Körperorgane*) (Snell, 1955, p. 33). Later approaches fall into the same trap, when they interpret the Homeric functions related to the soul's realm as “psychosomatic”. See Long, 2015.



difficult passages or scenes. I assume that this tool is not the best one to specifically interpret the Homeric Psychology. Strangely enough, its use is also “anachronistic”, since those grammarians lived after Plato and Aristotle. As indicated, it is very difficult to escape the anachronistic paradox: How could an interpreter understand an ancient text avoiding a contemporary vocabulary which is naturally involved in a modern philosophical framework? Therefore, all kinds of Homeric interpretation are (or will be) “anachronistic”, since the interpreters or readers are always dealing with a later vocabulary which reflects a certain philosophical background. In the past, hermeneutical theories (*e.g.* Gadamer, Ricouer, Rorty) and linguistic or literary ones (*e.g.* Bakhtin, Tynyanov, Jakobson, Barthes, Iser, Genette, Todorov, Kristeva) have already shown the same point: it is impossible to interpret an ancient text without being “anachronistic”, especially when we read it with our modern vocabulary.

I am convinced that a reader of Homer should not ignore the philosophical issues implied in the interpretation and, in order to overcome the traditional approaches, it is essential to find an alternative theory with a more appropriate vocabulary able to clarify the character’s psychological activities or manifestations. Therefore, I think that contemporary interpreters should dedicate themselves to a better understanding of Homeric characters through a Greek philosophical vocabulary – particularly when they are dealing with the psychology involved in the plot. As we know, Plato already uses Homeric references in his works and interprets innumerable passages. Moreover, he also uses some of these passages to illustrate some aspects of his psychological theory.¹¹ As Homer’s reader, Plato already shows us a historical intertextuality that cannot be simply disregarded. As we saw, if every interpretation of the Homeric psychology is anachronistic, the smallest anachronism would be the one that is concerned with the use of the first well established Greek psychological theory. The same one that tried to understand and, more interesting, already applied Homeric references to explain its theory.¹²

This also means that in the light of Plato’s philosophy it is far easier to figure out what kind of personality a character has and to understand his or her reactions, beliefs or desires.¹³ I am more precisely suggesting that the paradigm of Plato’s doctrine of the soul (*Republic IV*) can help us explain Paris’ reactions and his moral responses in important scenes of the *Iliad 3 and 6*. With this example, I want to go beyond the traditional interpretation – developmentalist

¹¹ *E.g. Resp.* 441b7-c1.

¹² *Cf.* the example of Porphyry’s *Homeric Questions on the Iliad (Quaestiones Homericae)*.

¹³ Certainly, it is possible to reach similar conclusions with other philosophical tools (*cf.* Vyacheslavovich, 2014), but my point is that this is much more difficult than simply applying Plato’s philosophical assessments.



perspective – of the Homeric psychology and advocate an alternative philosophical approach. It is also important to emphasize that I am trying to better frame ancient connotations of Greek words with a coherent philosophical instrument. This means that in order to better identify the lexical specificity of certain words, we have to contrast them with another context,¹⁴ most importantly, a philosophical one, since we are trying to understand complex emotions.

Another key aspect refers to the fact that the most defining attribute of a human character in the *Iliad*'s plot is represented by the functions of his (or her) θυμός. This word metaphorically expresses the feelings of “courage”, “anger”, “wrath” or “grief” and stands out in war situation. Since other psychological theories presented by Plato – like the bipartition of the soul¹⁵ – do not specifically value the important role of the θυμός in a war situation and, therefore, do not take into consideration (or explain) the distinctive role of a warrior in war, I am assuming that the best psychological theory to illustrate the human reactions in this environment is the one that clearly distinguishes the functions of the θυμός. Thus, Plato's tripartite theory of the soul, particularly in the *Republic IV*, is a very important paradigm for our intertextual approach. As we shall see, it can enlighten the role of important words like θυμός or ἔρωσ and the intrapsychic conflict they express in the Iliadic context and, besides, it is able to underline Paris' possible explanations for the actions he took. In fact, I believe that Plato's tripartite theory is extremely valuable to shed light on the structure of characters' souls in the *Iliad*, something that other psychological approaches could also do, but in a more limitative way.

More specifically, the ordinary interpretation would maintain that Paris' (re)actions at the beginning of *Iliad* are incomprehensible, since he simply fled the duel with Menelaus in Book 3 and later – in Book 6 – he is irremediably staying in a chamber with Helen and avoiding to return to the battlefield. In my opinion, this kind of interpretation ignores the conflicts inside Paris' soul and the way in which the Homeric soul operates¹⁶. In the same way, the traditionalists emphasize the role of divine intervention in the plot. This means that each character's decision has a god's assistance as explanation and cannot decide without this kind of intervention. I think that this position is at least misleading, as we can see below.

¹⁴ When we detach the words of their original context, we can better discern their “lexical nuance” or “lexical color” (Tynyanov, 1972, p. 63). Although the aim is to (inter-)contextualize the words in a different sense, Tynyanov's argument should be remembered.

¹⁵ As regard to bipartition, I mean the contrast between two psychological principles or elements: reason and passions. See e.g. Plato *Gorg.* 491d-e or *Soph.* 228b.

¹⁶ In a relevant passage, Plato explains how different elements (or principles) of the soul conflict with each other and quotes Homer. He then concludes: “Here Homer has clearly represented that there is an element in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing.” (*Resp.* 441b7-c1). Cf. *Phd.* 94d-e. The *Republic*'s translations follow P. Shorey (1969).



2 WHAT PARIS' (RE-)ACTIONS REALLY TELL US: A READING BASED ON PLATO'S TRIPARTITE THEORY

In this section, I shall emphasize the importance of Plato's philosophical framework, in particular Plato's tripartite theory of soul in the *Republic IV*, and its terminological adaptation to the description of a Homeric character. Of course, other ancient works will be mentioned (e.g. *Phaedrus*) and some associations will be made, particularly with the Aristotelian approach on human character (e.g. *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*).

Regarding the background involved and the scenes related to Paris' participation at the beginning of the *Iliad*, there are some important aspects to remember. The Greek achievements in the war are especially portrayed in the Books 4, 5 and 6.¹⁷ In Book 5, we are faced with Diomedes' ἀριστεία which is still being told in Book 6 (12-19 and 119-236). Book 6 refers to the 22nd day in the storyline of the poem which extends across almost six Books in total (*Il.* 2, 48 till 7, 380) (Latacz, 2002, p. 152. Cf. Stoevesandt, 2008, p. 11). Interestingly, our focus on Paris' actions – which are particularly described between the end of the third and the beginning of the seventh Book – occurs on only one day. Moreover, the poet-narrator clearly indicates that in Book 6 the gods leave the battlefield (Graziosi, Haubold, 2010, p. 25) and the human actions do not suffer the intervention of gods (Postlethwaite, 2000, p. 97).

With that in mind, we are able to start interpreting some scenes involving Paris and Hector, and try to understand the characters' intra-psycho dynamics. In the *Iliad* 6, the poet-narrator begins to show us Hector's perceptual view within the Trojan's city walls (237). It is a special fact that Hector aims to call Paris to battle against the Greeks (*Il.* 6, 280-281, 326-331). The readers or addressees can easily distinguish Hector's and Paris' main characteristics, when Hector reproaches his comportment (*Il.* 6, 325-368). First of all, it is very interesting to note that Hector tries to understand Paris' behavior and uses the word anger (χόλος) (326) as a possible explanation to his reaction or impulses. Hector is talking about Paris' escape after the duel with Menelaus. Since then, this is the first time both meet each other. The use of the word is also commented and discussed. Paris has no cause to be angry (Willcock, 1970, p. 212). Some interpreters think that Hector is trying to reconcile with his brother and, because of that, he supposes that Paris experienced the same kind of fury that the Trojans felt against him after the duel (*Il.* 3, 454) (Kirk, 1990, p. 203; cf. Stoevesandt, 2008, pp. 110-111). Others quote the bT

¹⁷ We also know that the Books II-VII depict an external analepsis. Cf. Stoevesandt, 2008, p. 11.

scholia and understand it as “a pretext for his inactivity” (Graziosi, Haubold, 2010, p. 170). I think that Paris’ motivation can be better explained if we read the verses in the sequence (*Il.* 6, 334-339). Paris says that it is not due to anger (χόλος) or to indignation (νέμεσις) that he remains outside the battlefield, but rather due to sorrow or grief (ἄχος) (*Il.* 6, 336). Now Paris seems to understand the negative effects of his behavior. He is certainly not feeling shame, as he simply left the Trojans and his brothers alone in the battlefield. In truth, he momentarily feels guilt and recognizes the need to return to the combat (*Il.* 6, 338-339).¹⁸

If we consider Plato’s psychology in the *Republic IV*, in which he discerns a “*rational element*” (λογιστικόν) from an “*irrational and desiderative*” one (ἄλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν) (*Resp.* 439d4-7) and declares that a third element (or function), the θυμοειδής, lies in between and is able to assist the “*rational element*” (441e4-6)¹⁹, we can easily associate such psychic manifestations with Paris’ attitudes in the plot. Due to two central motives, Plato’s psychological vocabulary will be applied to the scenes. On the one hand, the tripartite division is especially relevant for the *Iliad*, because it highlights the θυμοειδής – an element associated with the manifestations of the θυμός (*Resp.* 441b6). And in a war scenario, this element of the soul is easily displayed (by the narrator) and identified (by readers), as it results from active emotions that emerge during a battle, *i.e.* courage, rage, fury, shame or fear. On the other hand, the θυμοειδής is able to assist the “*rational element*” (λογιστικόν) (*Resp.* 441a2) and, for instance, can help a virtuous person in the process of rationalization of emotions. That is to say, it can assist an agent to clarify or explain emotions, desires or (re-)actions.

In terms of Plato’s terminology, it is possible to affirm that Paris – in contrast to the *epithymetic* behavior that he shows by the end of the third Book until the moment in which he meets Hector in the sixth Book – does not express courage (θυμός). From my perspective, the courage he will later express, which is a result of Hector’s admonition (*Il.* 6, 325-331), is a symbol of the overcoming of this earlier *epithymetic* reaction with Helen (*Il.* 3, 441-446)²⁰.

There are two evidences for this previous *epithymetic* state at the end of *Iliad* 3:

1) Paris is under the influence of “*passion*” (ἔρωσ) and “*desire*” (ἔμερος) (*Il.* 3, 442 and 446). Both words can be associated with sexual pleasure (ἀφροδίσια) in the context (see

¹⁸ Against the opinion that the Homeric world represents a “*shame cultur*”, I understand that a Homeric character is able to express a feeling like guilt. Cf. esp. Dodds, 1951, pp. 28-50; Williams, 1993, pp. 5, 78ff. and 88.

¹⁹ “*Does it not belong to the rational part (λογιστικόν) to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the θυμοειδής to obey (ὑπήκουσ) this and to be its ally (σύμμαχος)?*” (*Resp.* 441e4-6).

²⁰ Graziosi and Haubold emphasize that „*Paris finally leaves Helen’s bedroom, after having sex with her, and re-enters the battlefield*” and quote the bT-scholia ad 6, 507: δεσμός Ἀλεξάνδρου ἢ Ἑλένη (*Helen was Alexandros’ fetter*) (2010, p. 226). It is fair to say that for the bT-scholia Paris was metaphorically fettered in Helen’s chamber. In philosophical terms, this means that an element of the soul (ἐπιθυμητικόν) manifests itself and governs Paris’ soul for a certain period of time.



Proscurcin Jr., 2014, pp. 195-203). Even more interesting is that Ἀφροδίτη (Aphrodite) is responsible for the removal of the defeated Paris from the place of the duel with Menelaus and that she sets him down in his bedchamber (*Il.* 3, 380-382).²¹ Here I am not going to discuss the metaphorical use of the goddess as a personification of an emotion by the poet-narrator, but I argue that it typically illustrates Paris' behavior at that moment.

In the Homeric language, the name of Ἀφροδίτη is normally connected with a character's *epithymetic* reaction and, in my view, ἔρωσ would metonymically mean ἐπιθυμία for Plato. For example, in *Iliad* 14, we can observe how Zeus was trapped by his desire (ἔρος) (14, 294), due to Aphrodite's famous belt (*Il.* 14, 217). In that scene, he says to Hera: “*For never before has love for any goddess or woman/ so melted about the heart inside me, broken it to submission,*”²² (*Il.* 14, 315-316).²³ It is remarkable that Paris says something similar in the Book 3: “*Never before as now has passion enmeshed my senses,*”²⁴ (*Il.* 3, 442).²⁵

Both verses are expressions of an *epithymetic* reaction and can be related to the “*irrational and desiderative*” element (ἐπιθυμητικόν) in Plato's tripartite theory. The *epithymetic* element – that is often emphasized and explained by Plato – would have ἔρωσ as its typical expression in Homer.

In this respect, in *Phaedrus* Plato also makes clear that “*love*” (ἔρωσ) is a “*desire*” (ἐπιθυμία)²⁶ and emphasizes that when it rules the actions of a person, it causes “*excess*” (ὑβρις). It is also interesting to see that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book 7) also speaks about a kind of lack of self-control (ἀκρασία) in reference to desire (ἐπιθυμία) and anger (θυμός):

Hence anger (θυμός) follows reason (τῷ λόγῳ) in a manner, but desire (ἐπιθυμία) does not. Therefore, yielding to desire is more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a way controlled by reason, but the other is controlled not by reason but by desire. (*EN* 1149b1-4)²⁷.

²¹ In *Iliad* 5, Aphrodite is injured by Diomedes on the battlefield. The event may symbolize a Greek punishment and a kind of justice. Regarding Aphrodite's name, confer *Rhet.* 1400b23-24 (Euripides *Tro.* 989-990); *Crat.* 406c-d (Hesiod, *Th.* 195-206). See also e.g. *Symp.* 180dff., *inter alia*.

²² “οὐ γὰρ πῶ ποτέ μ' ὦδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς/ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν, ...”

²³ The *Iliad*'s translations in this paper follow R. Lattimore.

²⁴ “οὐ γὰρ πῶ ποτέ μ' ὦδέ γ' ἔρωσ φρένας ἀμφεκάλυψεν, ...”

²⁵ Cf. *Cypria*, 1 and 2.

²⁶ “*Now when opinion leads through reason (λόγῳ) toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint (σωφροσύνη), but when desire (ἐπιθυμία) irrationally (ἄλόγως) drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess (ὑβρις)*” (*Phaedr.* 237d-238a2) (transl. H. Fowler).

²⁷ ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πῶς, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχίων οὖν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου πῶς ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. (transl. H. Rackham)



For both philosophers, emotions like ἔρωσ or ἕμερος are irrational and can lead to excess (ὑβρις)²⁸. In the above context, Aristotle also quotes a passage of the *Iliad* 14 (EN 1149b16-18), in which the poet narrates the properties of Aphrodite's belt: “and on it are figured all beguilements, and loveliness/ is figured upon it, and passion of sex is there, and the whispered/ endearment that steals the heart away even from the thoughtful”²⁹ (Il. 14, 215-217).³⁰ Later Hector will condemn Paris' actions exactly as if he had committed a ὑβρις (Il. 6, 326-331). In any event, there is an internal conflict inside Paris' soul. I believe that the older brother expects some sort of behavior adjustment and Paris' compliance with community norms, as indeed will happen. Following that, it is likely to say that Paris suffered a sort of ὑβρις related to desire for ἔρωσ (*Phdr.* 238a-c)³¹.

2) After his rescue by Aphrodite – that symbolizes his *epithymetic* reaction – Paris remains in the chamber with Helen until the sixth Book. There he is alone with Helen and not any longer with the Trojans and the other warriors. In my understanding, his *epithymetic* response becomes considerably stronger in a situation like that and the *thymetic* element falls silent or simply aligns with the desires of the *epithymetic* one, since Paris does not act under the impulses of θυμός. Once again Paris' psychic state can be better explained in the light of Plato's philosophy. In the *Republic*, Plato approaches the issue of the grief in the public sphere. Plato thinks that it is better for a young man with a stroke of fate, “when he is observed by his equals” than “when he is in solitude alone by himself” (*Resp.* 604a2-5). According to Plato, the steadfastness of the θυμός acts better if a person is observed by other people. The person will “be more likely to resist and fight against his grief”. Plato even points out:

But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing (*Resp.* 604a-b).³²

Due to Plato's considerations, I am convinced that Paris feels no shame till Hector's admonition in book 6. This happens not only because of his young age, but also because he is

²⁸ See e.g. Plato, *Phaedr.* 238a-b.

²⁹ ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελεκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο: / ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἔν δ' ἕμερος, ἔν δ' ὀαριστὺς/πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων.

³⁰ Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 390c.

³¹ In Aristotelian terms, we would call it ἀκρασία related to ἐπιθυμία (EN 1149b18-20), since Paris is simply led by his emotions (πάθη) (EN 1150b21-22).

³² In Plato's early dialogue *Laches*, Socrates alludes that one can use the courage to fight against desire (ἐπιθυμίας) and pleasure (ἡδονάς). See Plato, *Laches* 191d6-e1. For Laches, the endurance (καρτερία) of the soul is an attribute of the courage (ἀνδρεία), although Socrates explains that it is just not possible to say that all sorts of endurances appear as courage. Cf. *Lach.* 192b9-c2.



away from the Trojan warriors, who are currently fighting. Inside the city walls, he is without the peer pressure and without control or observation. As already highlighted, the main function of the *thymetic* or spirited part of the soul is exactly to keep the steadfastness against the *epithymetic* desires. When Paris is alone in the chamber with his wife, the *thymetic* part certainly remains silent. The spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές), which is an intermediate part (*Resp.* 439e) between the desiderative (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν) part of the soul, can either lie still or stand by the *epithymetic* faculty. In any case, for Paris it is better to be at home than to feel, as Helen says, “*indignation and all things of shame*”³³ (*Il.* 6, 351) or, as Hector puts it, to hear things like that (*Il.* 6, 524).

Although shame and other emotions are not virtues (*EN* 1128b10-11), they compose the dispositions of character (ἔξεις). Aristotle claims that it is reprehensible not to feel shame (*EN* 1108a31-36).³⁴ As Aristotle suggests, a person behaves correctly (good) or falsely (bad) in respect to the emotions and with that he or she constitutes his or her dispositions (ἔξεις) (*EN* 1105b26-28). In the context of the Homeric poems, I believe that the addressees (readers) are responsible to connote and to judge such dispositions. This kind of action derives from a typical feature of Homeric poems: It is not the task of the poet-narrator to personally mention the character’s dispositions (*cf. Poet.* 1460a5-7). Due to the characters’ speeches and actions, the addressees are capable to denote or to designate the characteristics of Paris and Hector. In this respect, only the readers can say if a character is trustworthy or honest and another one unreliable and unfaithful. Homer does not do such a thing as a narrator. The task to explain these characteristics remains on the side of the addressees (or interpreters). This perspective will establish the general structure of a character’s personality. In this way, it is easy to understand the importance of the readers’ active role in shaping the meaning of different words in the epic text.

This becomes clear when we consider Paris’ youthful behavior. I am referring here to the inclinations that the young men frequently show in the face of *epithymetic* impulses, what Aristotle exemplarily shows in the *Rhetoric*³⁵. Paris has this kind of young character, *i.e.* ἡθος or ἔξις. Indeed, he cannot control his bodily desires at the end of *Iliad* 3. The poet-narrator

³³ “...νέμεσίν τε καὶ αἴσχεα...”

³⁴ “*There are also modes of observing a mean in the sphere of and in relation to the emotions. For in these also one man is spoken of as moderate and another as excessive – for example the bashful man whose modesty takes alarm at everything; while he that is deficient in shame, or abashed at nothing whatsoever, is shameless, and the man of middle character modest.*” (*EN* 1108a31-36).

³⁵ “*The young, as to character, are ready to desire (ἐπιθυμητικοί) and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires (τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν) they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure (τὰ ἀφροδίσια) and these they are unable to control*” (*Rhet.* 1389a3-4) (transl. J.H. Freese).



contextualizes the reaction depicting Aphrodite as the responsible goddess. However, I hold the view that the aim is to facilitate the plot or simply justify Paris uncommon acting. The sexual desire (ἔρως namely ἐπιθυμία) is easier to discern in the young men, but young people also tend to react in an excessive way in relation to the θυμός.

However, in the *Iliad* it is possible to discern situations in which a young man may react *noetically* before an older one that in turn acts under the *thymetic* element. In *Iliad* 23, it is particularly noteworthy how Antilochus offers a *noetic* answer to Menelaus' *thymetic* reaction, which is based on an abrupt sense of injustice³⁶. Although Antilochus is younger than Menelaus, he seems to be more reasonable in the discussion. The readers can identify the presence of the *noetic* function in Antilochus' speech and connect it with Plato's explanations of the functions of the λογιστικόν. Following that, the poet-narrator emphasizes the recovery of Menelaus' *noetic* thinking with a simile:

But his anger (θυμός)/ was softened, as with dew the ears of corn are softened/
in the standing corn growth of a shuddering field. For you also/ the heart, o
Menelaos, was thus softened within you (μετὰ φρεσὶ θυμὸς) (Il. 23, 597-600).

Again, the addressees can observe the contrast between different functions of the soul in Homer: the *thymetic* element can act against or in favor of the *noetic* one. Though younger, this time Antilochus shows a greater self-control and is able to quickly rationalize his actions. He manifests temperance (σωφροσύνη), since he can control his desires (*Resp.* 430e6-7)³⁷. We can better see this ability when we read Menelaus' answer: “*this time your youth got the better of your intelligence*” [νῦν αὖτε νόον νίκησε νεοίη.] (Il. 23, 604). It seems that an older man can have a “youthful character” in Homer, in the same way that we can see in Aristotle (*EN* 1095b6-7).

When Hector admonishes and rebukes Paris, we see – especially in the last scene of Book 6 – that he still believes in him (Il. 6, 526). It seems also that Hector's relationship to Paris in this book is pretty much like a father-son type relationship. Here, things become very interesting when we apply a Platonic reading of the passage. Within this philosophical view, it is possible to identify Hector's inflated expectation that Paris will improve his behavior. Hector knows his brother and knows that he can convince him with a rebuke or an admonition in order to make him master his desiderative part of the soul and ultimately to understand the importance

³⁶ “Enough now. For I, my lord Menelaos, am younger/ by far than you, and you are the greater and go before me. / You know how greedy transgressions flower in a young man, seeing/ that his mind (νόος) is the more active but his judgment (μῆτις) is lightweight. Therefore/ I would have your heart be patient with me” (Il. 23, 587-591).

³⁷ As a passage from the *Republic* shows: “Again, will our young people not need the σωφροσύνη?” (*Resp.* 389d7).



of his participation in the war. Hector has the ruler's due authority and Paris must hear (and obey) him (ὀπήκουζ) (*Resp.* 389e)³⁸. In this sense, it is likely that Hector's goal here is to awake the rational part of Paris' soul and thus it is a call for σωφροσύνη (*Resp.* 389d9-e2)³⁹.

Ultimately, Paris expresses the conviction that it is better to return to the battlefield (*Il.* 6, 338-339). He exposes the desire to fight alongside his brother. At the end of *Iliad* 6, there is a direct speech: "*Brother, I fear that I have held back your haste, by being/ slow on the way, not coming in time, as you commanded me.*" (*Il.* 6, 518-519). It seems here that the famous simile in the *Il.* 6, 506-514 supports Paris' intention. This way, Paris puts into words the disposition that is already illustrated in the ἦθος-simile and recognizes his delay, demonstrating guilt. At that moment, Paris grasps the words of Hector as a command, *i.e.* he understands at first glance Hector's "recommendation" as a "command". Then the older brother encourages him with a compliment: "*you are a strong man*" (*Il.* 6, 522).⁴⁰

Hector is concerned and shows solidarity with his brother: "*And my heart (κῆρ)/ is grieved in its thought, (ἐν θυμῶν)*"⁴¹ (*Il.* 6, 523-524). He seems to compare an "inner world" (feelings and thoughts) with an "external world" in which he experiences the judgements of his people and relatives. Both spheres are important and reveal that he is also thinking with his θυμός.⁴² Due to Paris' former behavior, he already felt emotional pain related to this element of the soul. Furthermore, according to a Platonic reading, one can interpret that in the last speech Hector manifests a kind of *noetic* consideration and once again his θυμός assists his thinking (*Resp.* 440e6-7, 441a3, 441e4-6).

We could see that – in the case of Paris – an emotion appears (*sexual desire*: ἐπιθυμίαν) and the soul experiences an effect. Firstly, due to a lack of judgement he receives a certain designation in connection with his uncontrolled emotion of ἐπιθυμία (*Iliad* 3). Later, he can recover his θυμός and the poet-narrator shows that he can act with the faculty associated to this emotion. At the end of *Iliad* 6 the addressees observe the recovery of his courage (ἀνδρεία) and ascertain that Hector helped him. Hector's admonition or exhortation fosters Paris' *thymetic* element (θυμοειδές) to be an ally of the rational one (λογιστικόν). Since then, he begins to act

³⁸ Aristotle would in a sense agree with the use of this word. Cf. *Resp.* 441e4-6. In Aristotelian terms, Hector wants to provoke his brother similarly to when a son hears (or shows obedience) to a father (τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν) for the specific purpose that Paris's appetitive element of the soul can and shall obey the rational one (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) (*EN* 1103a1-2).

³⁹ *Resp.* 389d-e: "*And for the multitude are not the main points of self-control (σωφροσύνη) these: to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?*" Cf. *Grg.* 506e-507c. The σωφροσύνη is often associated with justice, cf. esp. *Resp.* 430d and *Leg.* 863e-864b.

⁴⁰ Supposedly he intends to provoke the good inside Paris with this compliment. See Aristotle *EN* 1101b32-33.

⁴¹ Of course, it seems to me that it would be better to understand ἐν θυμῶν as "in its θυμός". This can be a locative case, but also an instrumental one.

⁴² See also the dialog between Hector and Andromache: *Il.* 6, 444 und 447.



in a different way.⁴³ It is as if these elements begin to act harmoniously (*cf. Resp.* 442c10-d1) and Paris gains courage (442b11-c3). From another perspective, Aristotle would probably say that Paris manifests two kinds of dispositions: initially, incontinence (ἀκρασία) concerned with ἐπιθυμία, when he stays with Helen; later, courage (ἀνδρεία) to his brother.⁴⁴

In my view, Paris recovers the function of the spirited element of the soul (θυμοειδής) in *Iliad* 6⁴⁵ and the conversations with Hector are decisive to that. The function of the *thymetic* element of the soul was always active in Hector and now motivates the younger brother to fight. The effects of the current *thymetic* function of the soul in Paris are well illustrated by the first three verses of the *Iliad* 7:

So speaking Hektor the glorious swept on through the gates,
and with him went Alexandros his brother, both of them minded
in their hearts to do battle and take their part in the fighting. (*Il.* 7, 1-3)

3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the *Iliad* 6, Paris shows his character through his reactions and exhibits conflictive emotions in the scenes. These emotions seem to be confused or, for some, “primitive”. This paper tried to apply a different interpretation based on the intertextual approach. I think that contemporary readers of Homer have to take into account the philosophical vocabulary involved in the interpretation of emotions and the proper Greek vocabulary to better understand the character’s psychological activities. Thus, I argued that Plato’s tripartite theory of soul is an alternative instrument to philosophically approach the Homeric psychology. Since the problem of anachronism is insurmountable, the intertextual interpretation recognizes that readers already think within different philosophical paradigms and because of that, should apply a philosophical model that has been influenced by this Homeric tradition to better contextualize the characters’ emotions in the plot.

⁴³ Later Alexander means that he is as courageous as his brother, because they had the same upbringing (*Il.* 13, 777). As a matter of fact, in the same book he encourages his companions and urges them to go to battle (*Il.* 13, 767).

⁴⁴ In this context, Aristotle again speaks of two elements of the soul (*EE* 1221b27-28), but admits that θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are different kinds of desire associated with two distinctive kinds of emotions (πάθη) that enable the addressees to assign a certain faculty (δύναμις) to a person. In this respect, Aristotle agrees with Plato that “θυμός seems to hear what the λόγος says” [ὁ θυμός ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου] (*EE* 1149a25-26). In another context, Aristotle talks about a division of the soul with two irrational elements in which one of them has a share in reason (*EN* 1102b13-14).

⁴⁵ Or simply that the *thymetic* element finally aligns with the *noetic* one (λογιστικόν).



The so called “inexplicable” reaction of Paris at the end of Book 3 is firstly motivated by his escape. Following this, the events of being distant from the battlefield and staying together with Helen reveal Paris’ weakness in the face of the emotion of ἔρωσ. The intertextual interpretation revealed interesting aspects of the character’s intrapsychic conflict. We could observe how a manifestation associated to the *desiderative* or *epithymetic* element of the soul (ἐπιθυμητικόν) can silence the *spirited* or *thymetic* one. In the absence of expressions of the θυμός Paris cannot get out of the city. Hector’s admonition fosters this *thymetic* emotion. At the end of *Iliad* 6, Paris’ older brother helps him recover his courage (ἀνδρεία).

When Paris is alone with Helen, he is not continent (ἐγκρατής) (cf. *Resp.* 430e6-7). Without a *noetic* deliberation he lets himself be carried away by his ἔρωσ (Ἀφροδίτη). I am convinced that for Plato, ἔρωσ metonymically means ἐπιθυμία. The uncontrolled emotion of ἐπιθυμία enables readers to observe Paris’ erotic reaction (ἐρωτικός). This kind of response shows his inability to control pleasures and appetites (ἐπιθυμιῶν). Due to this (re-)action, my impression is that Hector has to remind Paris to respect the society’s values (habits).⁴⁶ Paris explains that due to sorrow (ἄχος) (*Il.* 6, 336), he has remained outside the battlefield and now he indicates that he wants to return: “*that way seems to me also the better one.*” (*Il.* 6, 338-339). Finally, Paris seems to understand the effects of his behavior. He feels guilty and recognizes the need to return to the combat. Paris’ desires and intentions characterize his behavior and Plato’s tripartite theory helped us determine how certain manifestations of the soul (ἔρωσ, θυμός or νόος) can be associated with specific elements of the soul. The different elements expose the conflict inside Paris’ soul and show how the character acts in the face of certain emotions of pleasure and pain.

The Platonic approach is a trustful instrument to explain Paris’ mixed reactions and conflicts. However, the most important thing is to grasp Paris’ psychology through this Greek philosophical framework – grounded in desires and elements of the soul – which allowed us to depict a coherent model of Homeric interpretation.

⁴⁶ Something that Helen also tries to do (*Il.* 6 337-338).



REFERENCES

- ADKINS, Arthur W. H. *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- BAKHTIN, Mikhail M. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- CAIRNS, Douglas L. *Homeric Psychology*. In: *The Classical Review*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1992, pp. 1-3.
- DODDS, Eric R. *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951.
- GILL, Christopher. *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996.
- GRAZIOSI, Barbara, HAUBOLD, Johannes. *Homer: Iliad, Book VI*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- JAHN, Thomas. *Zum Wortfeld 'Seele-Geist' in der Sprache Homers*. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1987.
- KIRK, Geoffrey S. *The Iliad: A Commentary (Vol. II: books 5-8)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- KRISTEVA, Julia. *Desire in Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- KRISTEVA, Julia. *Revolution in Poetic Language*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- LATACZ, Joachim. *Zur Struktur der Ilias*. In: *Prolegomena. Homers Ilias: Gesamtkommentar* (ed. J. Latacz). 2nd ed., Munich/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2002.
- LESKY, Albin. *Bruno Snell: Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen. 2., erw. Auflage*. In: *Gnomon*, vol. 22, H. 3/4, 1950, pp. 97-106.
- LONG, Anthony A. *Greek Models of Mind and Self*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2015.
- POSTLETHWAITE, Norman. *Homer's Iliad: A Commentary on the Translation of Richmond Lattimore*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000.
- PROSCURCIN JUNIOR, Pedro. *Der Begriff Ethos bei Homer*. Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag Winter, 2014.
- PROSCURCIN JUNIOR, Pedro. Some Thoughts on the Socratic Use of *Iliad* X 224 in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Symposium*: a Dialogical Context Previous to the Dialectic Method? In: *Maia – Rivista di Letterature Classiche*, ano LXX, fasc. II, 2018, pp. 220-241, Maggio-Agosto.
- RUSSO, Joseph A.; SIMON, Bennet. *Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic Tradition*. In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. XXIX, no. 4, 1968, pp. 483-498, October-December.
- SCHMITT, Arbogast. *Selbständigkeit und Abhängigkeit menschlichen Handelns bei Homer: hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Psychologie Homers*. Mainz/Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990.
- SMITH, Nicholas. D. *Some Thoughts about the Origins of "Greek Ethics"*. In: *The Journal of Ethics*, vol 5, no. 1, 2001, pp. 3-20.
- SNELL, Bruno. *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*. Hamburg, Claassen, 1955.



Recebido em: 17/10/2020

Aprovado em: 18/12/2020

Publicado em: 20/12/2020

- STOEVESANDT, Magdalene. *Kommentar*. In: *Homer Ilias*. (eds. A. Bierl und J. Latacz). Vol. IV – F. 2 (Sechster Gesang – Z), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008.
- SULLIVAN, Shirley. D. *Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of Phren*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988.
- TYNYANOV, Yuri. *El Problema de la Lengua Poética* [1924]. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1972.
- VYACHESLAVOVICH, Garin S. *Homeric Psychological Lexicon and its Historical Context*. In: *Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, no. 3-4, 2014, pp. 173-176.
- WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, Ulrich von. *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus: Neue Homerischen Untersuchungen*. Berlin: Weidmann, 1927.
- WILLCOCK, Malcolm M. *A Commentary on Homer's Iliad (Books I-VI)*. London: Macmillan, 1970.
- WILLIAMS, Bernard A. *Shame and Necessity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.