A DEATH BLOW TO PURE PROCEDURALISM IN DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS

the problem of prerequisites

Résumé

Deliberative democracy contains a theory of legitimacy. One of its versions is pure proceduralism, according to which the principles establishing terms of political cooperation in deliberative systems should inform mainly the process of deliberation and no additional substantive elements, except to the extent that they are necessary for a fair process. This paper shows that pure proceduralism faces the ‘problem of prerequisites’. It consists in the fact that, even if pure proceduralism may be a criterion of legitimacy, the legitimacy of pure proceduralism as a source of subsequent legitimacy is not grounded in deliberative procedures. The problem comprises two arguments: the argument from the prerequisite of procedural membership (the establishment of membership rights to procedures must be immune to deliberation); and the argument from the prerequisite of procedural ruling (the rule establishing the quantitative threshold from which a decision is reached must be immune to deliberation).

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Biographie de l'auteur

André Santos Campos, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Andre Santos Campos (PhD University of Lisbon 2009) é investigador principal da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Sua pesquisa concentra-se em temas na intersecção da Filosofia Política, Ética, Filosofia do Direito e História Intelectual, como justiça intergeracional, soberania, direitos humanos, representação e direito natural. É autor de 'Jus sive Potentia' (CFUL 2010), 'Spinoza's Revolutions in Natural Law' (Palgrave 2012) e 'Glosas Abertas de Filosofia do Direito' (Quid Juris 2013); ele é o editor de 'Spinoza. Basic Concepts '(Imprint Academic 2016),' Spinoza and Law '(Routledge 2016) e o co-editor de' Challenges to Democratic Participation '(Lexington 2014),'

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Publiée
2018-09-17
Rubrique
Artigos