CONFLITO DE AGÊNCIA NA CRIAÇÃO E GESTÃO DOS REGIMES PRÓPRIOS DE PREVIDÊNCIA SOCIAL DOS MUNICÍPIOS DO ESTADO DE MATO GROSSO DO SUL

Abstract

The mismanagement of the Own Social Security Systems (RPPS) can cause major problems in public finances. The objective of this research is to verify possible manifestations of agency conflict in the creation and management of RPPS in the municipalities of Mato Grosso do Sul (MS). Possible agency conflicts can be noticed when the manager uses legislative loopholes to have more resources in his management in exchange for the commitment of future management resources. Data were collected on the transparency portals of the municipalities and on the website of the Social Security Secretariat (SPREV), applying descriptive statistics according to the characteristics of each RPPS. The analyzes were carried out in the 51 municipal RPPS existing in MS and, at the end of 2020, only 3 RPPS (Eldorado, Nova Alvorada do Sul and São Gabriel do Oeste) did not present an actuarial deficit and 43 municipalities instituted a plan for solving the actuarial deficit. Thus, it is concluded that the results demonstrate conflicts of interest in the administrations of RPPS, the need for greater commitment from managers and studies on the feasibility of maintaining social security institutes in most municipalities of MS.

Keywords: Own Social Security Systems, Agency Theory, Agency Conflict.