PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES ON "DECISION-MAKING"

Abstract

This essay seeks to gather a set of notes on the issue of "decision making", based on a reflection on the interpretation of the "being" of the man who is in force in Modernity. What has been gathered here points to the fact that, within this hegemonic interpretation, there is a appeal to the figure of a rational and autonomous "subject-agent", capable of self-legislating because it imagines a rational source of "principles" that enables to guide and order their conduct. With Martin Heidegger as blinders in this enterprise, it was possible to understand that from the definitive emergence of the "subject" in the Renaissance all actions are now susceptible to praise or reproach for the fact that they are the fruit of an "I" capable of thinking and deciding sometimes through "reason" or as a response to the inclinations we are all subjected as animalitas. Looking at the set of references and notes that have been raised here, we could see the enormous poverty in the ordinary interpretation of "acting" as a re-production of the exaltation of the free power of the will to make happen, or of the "weakness" with which we give in to the appeal of the passions. We understand that this representation of man's "being" prevents us from thinking in its true breadth the notion of "decision" within the human experience.